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HIS Survey period was one of the most active in recent history for
insurance law cases, including long-awaited decisions from the
Texas Supreme Court on the insurability of punitive damages and
an insurer's right of reimbursement from its insured. Other important
decisions from the state and federal courts addressed the applicability of
the Prompt Payment of Claims statute, the trigger of coverage under
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policies, rights between co-insur-
ers, the effect of a liability insurer's coverage denial on its right to chal-
lenge the reasonableness of a settlement, and when the insured's late
notice to the insurer will preclude coverage. Although a few of these
opinions were released after the Survey period, they are discussed in this
Article because of their significance and the impact they will have on
insurers and insureds alike.
II. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
The Texas Supreme Court issued two decisions limiting an insurer's
right to recover amounts paid to settle third-party liability claims against
its insured. The first case involved an insurer's right to seek reimburse-
ment from its insured, while the second case involved an insurer's right to
seek reimbursement from a co-insurer.
A. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT FROM ITS INSURED
In a much anticipated opinion, Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London
v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc.,1 the Texas Supreme Court
revisited the issue of whether an insurer is entitled to reimbursement
from its insured of amounts it paid to settle third-party claims against the
insured when it later determined that those claims are not covered under
* B.M., Baylor University; J.D., Baylor School of Law. Partner, Wilson, Elser, Mos-
kowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP.
** B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University School
of Law. Partner, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP.
*** B.A., University of Texas, Austin; J.D., Southern Methodist University School of
Law. Associate, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP.
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the policy.2 The supreme court first addressed this issue in 2000, in Texas
Association of Counties County Government Risk Management Pool v.
Matagorda County,3 holding that an insurer may seek reimbursement
only if it "obtains the insured's clear and unequivocal consent to the set-
tlement and the insurer's right to seek reimbursement."'4 In its original
opinion in Frank's Casing, the supreme court had "clarif[ied]" Matagorda
County and had expanded the insurer's right of reimbursement to include
the additional circumstances: (1) when the insured demands that the in-
surer accept a settlement offer that is within policy limits, or (2) when the
insured expressly agrees that the settlement offer should be accepted.5
The supreme court granted rehearing in Frank's Casing on January 6,
2006, and on February 1, 2008, withdrew its prior opinion and issued a
new opinion.6 The supreme court expressly declined to overrule Mata-
gorda County, reiterating that in weighing the varying risks surrounding
settlement offers when coverage is disputed, "insurers, on balance, are
better positioned to handle them 'either by drafting policies to specifi-
cally provide for reimbursement or by accounting for the possibility that
they may occasionally pay uncovered claims in their rate structure." 7
The supreme court next addressed whether the case was sufficiently
distinguishable from Matagorda County to justify an exception to the
Matagorda County rule and thereby permit reimbursement based on the
insured's implied consent. 8 The underwriters emphasized that (1) they
were excess carriers who did not have a duty to defend or otherwise have
unilateral control over settlement, (2) the policy prohibited settlement
without the insured's consent, and (3) the insured had demanded that the
underwriters settle the claim.9 Reasoning that "none of these distinctions
alleviates the concerns that drove the supreme court's analysis in Mata-
gorda County,"'0 the supreme court declined to recognize an exception to
the Matagorda County rule and accordingly refused to find an implied-in-
fact agreement.' The supreme court also refused to recognize a reim-
bursement right under the equitable theories of quantum meruit and
assumpsit.12
Consequently, after Frank's Casing, an insurer has a right of reimburse-
ment from its insured only if: (1) the policy specifically provides for reim-
bursement, or (2) the insured clearly and unequivocally consents to the
2. Id. at 43.
3. 52 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2000).
4. Frank's Casing, 246 S.W.3d at 43 (quoting Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 135).
5. Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools,
Inc., 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 735 (Tex. 2005), withdrawn, 246 S.W.3d 42, 42 (2008).
6. Frank's Casing, 246 S.W.3d at 43.
7. Id. at 47-48 (quoting Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 136).
8. Id. at 48.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Id. at 48-49.
12. Id. at 49-50.
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settlement and the insurer's right to seek reimbursement. 13
B. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT FROM A CO-INSURER
On certified questions from the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed whether a liability insurer, which pays more than its share to
settle a claim against its insured, has a right to seek reimbursement from
an underpaying co-insurer. 14 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Lib-
erty Mutual") and Mid-Continent Insurance Company ("Mid-Conti-
nent") both insured Kinsel Industries ("Kinsel") under respective $1
million comprehensive general liability ("CGL") policies. 15 The "policies
contained identical 'other insurance' clauses providing for equal or pro
rata sharing up to the co-insurers' respective policy limits if the loss is
covered by other primary insurance."'16 The insurers agreed that each
owed some portion of the defense and indemnity costs for a personal
injury lawsuit against Kinsel arising out of an auto accident and that a
total verdict for the claimants against all the defendants would be in the
$2-3 million range. The insurers, however, disagreed on the settlement
value of the claim against Kinsel. Although the insurers initially had the
same estimates regarding Kinsel's percentage of fault, Liberty Mutual in-
creased its estimate as the case progressed. After Mid-Continent refused
to increase its contribution to a settlement, Liberty Mutual agreed to set-
tle on behalf of Kinsel for $1.5 million. "Liberty Mutual demanded that
Mid-Continent contribute half, but Mid-Continent continued to calculate
the settlement value . . . at $300,000 and agreed to pay only $150,000.
Liberty Mutual... funded the remaining $1.35 million, paying $350,000
more than its $1 million CGL policy limit."'17 Liberty Mutual reserved its
right to seek recovery from Mid-Continent and subsequently sued Mid-
Continent for reimbursement of Mid-Continent's pro rata share of the
settlement.18
The supreme court first addressed whether Liberty Mutual had a direct
claim or right of action for reimbursement from Mid-Continent based on
contribution. 19 The supreme court reiterated the general rule that
if two or more insurers bind themselves to pay the entire loss insured
against, and one insurer pays the whole loss, the one so paying has a
right of action against his co-insurer, or co-insurers, for a ratable pro-
portion of the amount paid by him, because he has paid a debt which
is equally and concurrently due by the other insurers.
20
13. See id. at 43.
14. Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Tex. 2007).
15. Id. at 769.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 770.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 772.




The appropriate right of action is one for contribution, which requires
that the insurers share a common obligation "and that the insurer seeking
contribution has made a compulsory payment or other discharge of more
than its fair share of the common obligation. '21
"This direct claim for contribution between co-insurers disappears
when the insurance policies contain 'other insurance' or 'pro rata'
clauses."'22 Because the pro rata clause makes the contracts several and
independent of each other, the co-insurers have independent contractual
obligations and therefore, "do not meet the common obligation require-
ment of a contribution claim."'23 Thus, if a co-insurer pays more than its
contractually agreed upon proportionate share, it does so voluntarily
without a legal obligation to do so.24 Applying these principles, the su-
preme court explained that under their policies' pro rata clauses, Liberty
Mutual and Mid-Continent contractually agreed to pay a proportionate
share of Kinsel's loss up to $1 million, but they did not contract to create
obligations between themselves or to pay each other's proportionate
share of the loss. 25 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that there
was no contractual right of contribution, that the presence of the pro rata
clauses precluded an equitable right of contribution, and that it would not
create such an obligation under the common law.26
Next addressing whether Liberty Mutual could seek reimbursement
through subrogation, the supreme court explained that, under either con-
tractual or equitable subrogation, the insurer stands in the shoes of the
insured and obtains "only those rights held by the insured against a third
party, subject to any defenses held by the third party against the in-
sured."'27 Where two policies "provide coverage for a loss, the pro rata
clause does not create an exception to the principle" that an insured's
right of indemnity from the insurer is limited to the actual amount of loss;
rather, the pro rata clause "implements this principle by eliminating the
potential for double recovery by the insured. ' 28 Therefore, once the in-
sured recovers the full amount of its loss from one carrier, "the insured
has no further rights against the other insurer which has not contributed
to its recovery," and "the liability of the remaining insurer to the insured
ceases," even if that insurer has not defended or indemnified the in-
sured.29 The supreme court held that "a fully indemnified insured has no





25. Id. at 772-73.
26. Id. at 773 (disagreeing with Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Home Ins. Co. of Ill.,
21 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. dism'd by agr.), "to the extent it creates
a common law duty between co-primary insurers to reasonably exercise rights under an
insurance policy").
27. Id. at 774.




surer regardless of that insurer's contribution to the settlement. Having
fully recovered its loss, an insured has no contractual rights that a co-
insurer may assert against another co-insurer in subrogation.
30
Applying these principles, the supreme court concluded that, because
Kinsel had already been fully indemnified by Liberty Mutual, it had no
contractual rights against Mid-Continent and therefore, Liberty Mutual
had no contractual subrogation rights against Mid-Continent. 31 Finally,
the supreme court explained that because the underlying claimants had
not made a settlement offer within Mid-Continent's policy limits, Mid-
Continent did not breach a Stowers duty to Kinsel. 32 As such, Kinsel had
no common law rights against Mid-Continent to which Liberty Mutual
could be subrogated.33
III. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS STATUTE
1. Texas Supreme Court Ruled That the Prompt Payment of Claims
Statute Applies to a Liability Insurer's Defense, but Not
Indemnity Obligations for a Third-Party Claim
The Prompt Payment of Claims statute (the "Statute") 34 authorizes an
award of eighteen percent annual interest and reasonable attorneys' fees
when an insurer wrongfully refuses or delays payment of a "claim."
35
The Statute defines the term "claim" as a first-party claim made by an
insured that must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured, but does
not separately define "first-party claim."' 36 Texas state and federal courts
had been divided over the applicability of the statute to an insured's
claim under a liability policy for defense of a third-party claim.37 In La-
mar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the Texas Supreme
Court decided this issue on certified question from the Fifth Circuit.
38
The supreme court explained that it had "previously distinguished first-
party and third-party claims on the basis of the claimant's relationship to
the loss."'39 "[A] first-party claim is stated when 'an insured seeks recov-
ery for [its] own loss,' whereas a third-party claim is stated when 'an in-
sured seeks coverage for injuries to a third party."' 40 Based on this
30. Id. at 775-76.
31. Id. at 777.
32. Id. at 776 (referencing G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d
544, 547 (Tex. 1929)).
33. Id. at 776-77.
34. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051-.061 (Vernon 2008) (formerly codified as TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon 1991)).
35. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2007) (citing
TEX. INS. CODE § 542.060(a)).
36. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE § 542.051(2)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. (quoting Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 54 n.2 (Tex. 1997)).
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distinction, the supreme court determined that a defense claim is a first-
party claim because it relates solely to the insured's own loss:
Without the defense benefit provided by a liability policy, the in-
sured alone would be responsible for these costs. Unlike the loss
incurred in satisfaction of a judgment or settlement, this loss belongs
only to the insured and is in no way derivative of any loss suffered by
a third party. The claim for defense costs then is a first-party claim
because the insured is the only party who will suffer the loss or bene-
fit from the claim.41
The supreme court also addressed other courts' determination that the
Statute is "unworkable" in the context of an insured's claim for a defense
due to the various deadlines imposed for responding to and paying
claims. 42 For example, the Dallas Court of Appeals observed that at the
time of a claim for a defense, "the insured typically has not yet suffered
any actual loss .. . .[and] queried whether the insured would have to
submit its legal bills" to the insurer as received. 43 The supreme court
responded that the Statute's "apparent answer" to this query is "yes,"
explaining that "when the insurer wrongfully rejects its defense obliga-
tion, the insured has suffered an actual loss that is quantified after the
insured retains counsel and begins receiving statements for legal ser-
vices," and that these "invoices are the last piece of information needed
to put a value on the insured's loss."' 44 Accordingly, the supreme court
concluded that an insured's right to a defense benefit under a liability
policy is a "first-party claim" within the Statute's meaning and therefore,
the Statute applies when the insurer wrongfully refuses to promptly pay a
defense benefit owed to the insured.45
In contrast to the defense benefit at issue in Lamar Homes, the Texas
Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Evanston Insurance Co. v.
ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., held that the Statute does not extend to
an insured's claim under a liability policy for indemnification of a third-
party claim.46 After the insurer denied coverage, the insured settled with
the third-party claimant and then sued the insurer for recovery of the
settlement amount it had paid plus interest and attorney's fees under the
Statute.47 Reiterating the distinction between first-party and third-party
claims based on the claimant's relationship to the loss, the supreme court
reasoned that a loss incurred in satisfaction of a settlement belongs to the
third party and is not suffered directly by the insured.48 Characterizing
the insured's claim for coverage for injuries sustained by a third party as a
41. Id.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. (referencing TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 239, 241
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied)).
44. Id. at 19-20.
45. Id.
46. Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., 256 S.W.3d 660, at 674-75
(Tex. 2008).
47. Id. at 662-63.
48. Id. at 674-75.
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"classic third-party claim" and emphasizing that the legislature intended
that the Statute apply only to claims personal to the insured, the court
concluded that the insured was not entitled to any recovery under the
Statute.4
9
2. An Insurer's Interpleader of Policy Proceeds Does Not Relieve It of
Statutory Penalties for Delay Before Filing the Interpleader
In State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Martinez, the Texas Supreme Court
addressed whether the Statute applies to an insurer that is faced with
rival claims and interpleads its policy proceeds into the court registry.50
Despite recognizing that "[i]t has long been the rule in Texas that if an
insurer promptly interpleads policy proceeds, it cannot be subjected to
statutory penalties for delayed payment even if it missed the statutory
deadlines," the supreme court held that this interpleader exception to the
Statute did not survive the legislature's 1991 amendments to the
Statute.51
The supreme court stated three reasons for its holding: (1) the Statute
itself does not have an interpleader exception, and "creating [such] an
exception for interpleaders filed after [the Statute's sixty-day payment]
deadline would mean simply ignoring the [S]tatute in some cases"; (2)
under the 1991 amendments, the Statute must be liberally construed to
promote its underlying purpose, and "[w]hile exempting interpleaders
might be consistent with a strict construction, it is inconsistent with a lib-
eral one"; and (3) "compliance with the [S]tatute would not frustrate the
primary purpose behind the interpleader" of resolving rival claims be-
cause "given recent increases in avenues for communication and dispute
resolution, it is hard to argue that the statute's safe-harbor of 60 days-
double the period allowed throughout most of Texas history-is insuffi-
cient."' 52 Emphasizing that continuing to recognize an interpleader ex-
ception to the Statute would frustrate its purpose, but that removing the
exception would fulfill the purposes of both the Statute and interpleader,
the supreme court held that the insurer's interpleader did not render the
Statute inapplicable.5 3
Although the supreme court concluded that the insurer was subject to
statutory penalties for delay before the interpleader was filed, it ruled
that the court of appeals had improperly imposed statutory penalties for
the time after the interpleader was filed.54 Because Texas law instructs
that if a reasonable doubt exists as to the ownership of the policy pro-
ceeds, the insurer should interplead the proceeds, applying the Statue
post-interpleader would lead to the "absurd result" of "punish[ing] insur-
49. Id. at 675.
50. 216 S.W.3d 799, 800 (Tex. 2007).
51. Id. at 800, 804.
52. Id. at 804-05.
53. Id. at 805.
54. Id. at 800.
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ers for doing exactly what Texas law encourages. '55
B. BAD FAITH
In Crocker v. American National General Insurance Co., the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that an independent adjuster cannot be liable to
the insured in the absence of a contractual relationship between the in-
sured and the adjuster.5 6 The insureds submitted a claim under their
homeowners policy for water damage and mold, and the insurer retained
an independent adjuster to investigate the claim.57 The insurer subse-
quently denied coverage for the claim based on various policy exclusions,
and the insureds filed suit against the insurer and the independent ad-
juster asserting claims for breach of the common law and statutory duties
of good faith.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of both the insurer and the independent adjuster.5 8 First addressing
the insurer, the court determined that the insured's claim was excluded
from coverage and that "[a]s a general rule there can be no claim for bad
faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not cov-
ered."'59 Concerning the independent adjuster, the court explained that
"absent a contractual relationship between the insured and an adjuster,
the adjuster could not be liable to the insured for improper investigation
and settlement advice, 'regardless of whether [the insured] phrased his
allegations as negligence, bad faith, breach of contract, tortious interfer-
ence, or DTPA claims."' 60 Therefore, the adjuster had no legal duty to
the insureds and was entitled to summary judgment.61
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In the long-awaited Fairfield Insurance Company v. Stephens Martin
Paving, L.P. opinion, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the following
certified question from the Fifth Circuit: "Does Texas public policy pro-
hibit a liability insurance provider from indemnifying an award for puni-
tive damages imposed on its insured because of gross negligence?" 62 The
supreme court explained that the determination of this issue requires a
two-step analysis. 63 First, the supreme court decides whether the policy's
plain language "covers the exemplary damages sought in the underlying
55. Id. at 806.
56. 211 S.W.3d 928, 937-38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
57. Id. at 929.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 936 (quoting Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995)).
60. Id. at 938 (quoting Dear v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 908, 917 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1997, writ denied)).
61. Id.
62. 246 S.W.3d 653, 654 (Tex. 2008).
63. Id. at 655.
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suit against the insured. '64 Second, if such coverage exists, the supreme
court determines whether Texas public policy "allows or prohibits cover-
age in the circumstances of the underlying suit," looking first to express
statutory provisions on the insurability of exemplary damages "to deter-
mine whether the Legislature has made a policy decision. ' 65 In the ab-
sence of an explicit policy decision by the legislature, the supreme court
then considers the general public policies of Texas.66
Proceeding under this framework, the supreme court noted that be-
cause the certified question was directed only at Texas public policy, it
was presuming that the policy covered exemplary damages and was limit-
ing its discussion to the second prong. 67 The underlying suit was brought
by survivors of a deceased employee, and because the survivors had re-
ceived workers' compensation benefits, they were barred by statute from
recovering actual damages and sought only exemplary damages. 68 After
examining the statutory scheme and accompanying insurance regulation
of the Texas workers' compensation system, the supreme court concluded
based on the legislature's expressed intent that Texas public policy did
not prohibit insurance coverage for gross negligence in the instant case. 69
Although this expressed direction by the legislature resolved the insur-
ability of exemplary damages issue in the instant case, the supreme court,
recognizing the "import of this issue," proceeded to discuss "some of the
considerations relevant to determining whether Texas public policy pro-
hibits insurance coverage of exemplary damages in other contexts in the
absence of a clear legislative policy decision."' 70 After examining the his-
tory of the debate through statutes, cases, and treatises from across the
country, the supreme court explained that the determination of whether
to render an agreement for coverage of exemplary damages unenforce-
able on public policy grounds requires that "Texas' general policy favor-
ing freedom of contract," including consideration of "the reasonable
expectations of the parties and the value of certainty in enforcement of
contracts generally," be weighed against "the extent to which the agree-
ment frustrates important public policy. '71
The supreme court instructed that "[i]n situations where the Legisla-
ture has not spoken directly on whether public policy prohibits insurance
coverage of exemplary damages ... a court should consider the purpose
of exemplary damages," which is gleaned from "the common law and leg-
islative development of exemplary damages."' 72 "Legislative enactments




67. Id. at 656.
68. Id. at 655, 655 n.1.
69. Id. at 670.
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 663-64.
72. Id. at 660.
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ponent of exemplary damages in Texas today, and the most recent enact-
ments downplay[ed] the role of deterrence, and [instead] focus[ed]
squarely on the punitive aspect."' 73 The current exemplary damages stat-
ute identifies the following factors to be considered in determining the
amount of exemplary damages:
(1) the nature of the wrong;
(2) the character of the conduct involved;
(3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer;
(4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned,
(5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice
and propriety;
(6) the net worth of the defendant.74
The supreme court characterized the first, second, and fifth factors as
raising concerns of an objective nature focusing on the nature of the con-
duct; conversely, the third, fourth, and sixth factors focus subjectively on
what it will take to punish this defendant. 75 These factors impact the in-
surability of exemplary damages question in the following manner:
There is some inherent tension between the policies recognized by
freedom of contract and the policy behind awarding exemplary dam-
ages. Spreading the risk of, and obligation for, exemplary damages
through insurance does not affect the objective factors. They may be
evaluated without regard for individual personalities. The issue is
this: What penalty should this conduct, in the abstract, bear? But the
subjective factors are relevant to a determination of the amount of
exemplary damages only if the defendant must pay it to the plaintiff.
If exemplary damages are to be paid by insurance, it is less relevant
to set the amount based on whether the plaintiff was trusting or the
defendant calculating or wealthy.76
Finally, after discussing the few Texas cases that have considered the
insurability issue in light of the purpose behind exemplary damages, the
supreme court summarized
the general considerations that are important when determining
whether the policy behind exemplary damages should limit parties'
ability to contract for coverage of those damages. In the uninsured
and underinsured motorist context, it may be appropriate for policy-
holders to share in the burden of injuries caused by underinsured
motorists, but not in their punishment. In other words, the purpose
of exemplary damages may not be achieved by penalizing those who
obtain the insurance required by law for the wrongful acts of those
who do not.
The considerations may weigh differently when the insured is a
corporation or business that must pay exemplary damages for the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 667-68 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011(a) (Vernon
2008)).
75. Id. at 668.
76. Id. at 668 (emphasis in original).
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conduct of one or more of its employees. Where other employees
and management are not involved in or aware of an employee's
wrongful act, the purpose of exemplary damages may be achieved by
permitting coverage so as not to penalize many for the wrongful act
of one. When a party seeks damages in these circumstances, courts
should consider valid arguments that businesses be permitted to in-
sure against them.
Extreme circumstances may prompt a different analysis. The
touchstone is freedom of contract, but strong public policies may
compel a serious analysis into whether a court may legitimately bar
contracts of insurance for extreme and avoidable conduct that causes
injury. For example, liability policies themselves normally bar insur-
ance for damages caused by intentional conduct, as did the liability
policy in this case. The fact that insurance coverage for exemplary
damages may encourage reckless conduct likewise gives us pause.
Were the existence of insurance coverage to completely eviscerate
the punitive purpose behind awarding exemplary damages, it could
defeat not only an explicit legislative policy but also the court's tradi-
tional role in deterring conscious indifference. 77
Accordingly, in response to the certified question, the supreme court
answered that Texas public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage of
exemplary damages for gross negligence in the workers' compensation
context.78 The supreme court, however, emphasized that "without clear
legislative intent to generally prohibit or allow the insurance of exem-
plary damages arising from gross negligence," it was "declin[ing] to make
a broad proclamation of public policy," but was "instead offer[ing] some
considerations applicable to the analysis in other cases."'79 Consequently,
while Fairfield provides some guidance regarding insurability of punitive
damages, this issue has not been finally resolved and will likely continue
to be litigated.
B. A LIABILITY INSURER'S ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF COVERAGE
PROHIBITS IT FROM CHALLENGING THE REASONABLENESS
OF THE INSURED'S SETTLEMENT
In another significant case decided on rehearing, Evanston Insurance
Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court held that
a liability insurer which wrongfully denies coverage is barred from chal-
lenging the reasonableness of the amount of the insured's settlement with
the third-party claimant.8 0 There, the insured was sued and requested
coverage from its liability insurer, which denied coverage based on the
policy's terms. The insured then brought the insurer into the underlying
suit as a third-party defendant, seeking a declaration of coverage. When
77. Id. at 669-70.
78. Id. at 670.
79. Id.




the insurer continued to deny coverage in its pleadings, the insured set-
tled with the underlying claimants. The insured then continued the litiga-
tion of the coverage issues against the insurer, and it was determined that
the insurer had wrongfully denied coverage. 81
The supreme court explained that its last occasion to address this issue
was in Employers Casualty Co. v. Block,82 where it had held that "if an
insurer wrongfully denies coverage and its insured then enters into an
agreed judgment, the insurer is barred from challenging the reasonable-
ness of the settlement amount. '83 The supreme court acknowledged that
the instant case differed from Block in several respects, including the
forms of the settlement and the policy claims.84 First, the insurer in Block
breached the duty to defend; conversely, although the insurer in
ATOFINA had wrongfully denied coverage, no duty to defend was impli-
cated.8 5 Second, Block involved an agreed judgment between the insured
and the underlying claimant; conversely, in ATOFINA, the insured and
the underlying claimants used a contractual settlement agreement and
nonsuit.8 6 Despite these distinctions between the two cases, the supreme
court determined that Block nevertheless governed because its rule de-
rived not "from the nature of the violated policy term or the formality of
agreed judgments," but rather from principles of estoppel and waiver.87
As such, the key inquiry is whether the insurer received notice and had
an opportunity to participate in the settlement discussions.88 This inquiry
is not altered by the particular source of the insurer's attack on the settle-
ment amount, that is, a policy provision versus the common law reasona-
bleness requirement. 89 So, "[h]ad [the insurer] not unconditionally
denied coverage, it too would have been able to influence the amount of
the settlement. For these reasons, the difference in policy claims and the
absence of a formal judgment do not persuade us to abandon Block
here." 90
The supreme court also acknowledged that due to Block's procedural
posture of the underlying claimant suing the insurer as a judgment credi-
tor, it previously expressed "some disapproval" of Block in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy,91 which held that "[i]n no event, however,
is a judgment for plaintiff against defendant, rendered without a fully ad-
versarial trial, binding on defendant's insurer or admissible as evidence of
damages in an action against defendant's insurer by plaintiff as defen-
81. Id. at 671-72.
82. 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988).
83. ATOFINA, 256 S.W.3d at 671 (referencing Block, 744 S.W.2d at 943).
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id. at 671-72.
86. Id. at 672.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (alteration in original).
90. Id.
91. 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
[Vol. 61
Insurance Law
dant's assignee."' 92 Nevertheless, the supreme court reasoned that Gandy
did not disrupt the application of Block to the instant case for two rea-
sons.93 First, because Gandy's holding was "explicit and narrow, applying
only to a specific set of assignments with special attributes," its "invalida-
tion applies only to cases that present its five unique elements. '94 Since
the insured in ATOFINA made no assignment of its claim against the
insurer and sued the insurer directly, "Gandy's key factual predicate is
missing," thereby "remov[ing] this case from the formal bounds of
Gandy., 95
Second, the supreme court explained that Gandy's reason for invalidat-
ing assignments was that they "made evaluating the merits of the plain-
tiff's claim difficult by prolonging disputes and distorting trial litigation
motives;" if, however, this difficulty is not present in a particular case, it
should not be a basis to invalidate a settlement.96 The supreme court
reasoned that the insurer's challenge in ATOFINA did not implicate
Gandy's concerns because: (1) "[p]reventing insurers from litigating the
reasonableness of a settlement does not extend disputes; [but,] by defini-
tion, it shortens them; and (2) there was no "risk of distorting litigation or
settlement motives" because the insured had settled without knowing
whether coverage would exist, thus "leaving in place its motive to mini-
mize the settlement amount in case it became solely responsible for pay-
ment. '97 The supreme court decided that application of the Block rule in
this circumstance "will encourage early intervention by the insurers who
are best positioned to evaluate the worth of claims during settlement dis-
cussions. ' 98 In the absence of "relevant factual differences or Gandy
concerns to dissuade us from following Block," the supreme court held
that the insurer's denial of coverage barred it from challenging the rea-
sonableness of the settlement and that it was responsible for payment of
the settlement. 99
C. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. A Liability Insurer Has No Duty to Notify an Additional Insured
That a Defense Is Available
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Crocker, the Texas Supreme
Court held that "an insurer that has not been notified that a defense is
expected bears no extra-contractual duty to provide notice that a defense
is available to an additional insured who has not requested one." 100
Emeritus Corporation ("Emeritus") and Richard Morris ("Morris"), an
92. ATOFINA, 256 S.W.3d at 673 (quoting Gandy, 925 S.W.2d at 714).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 673.
96. Id. at 673-74.
97. Id. at 674.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2008).
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employee of Emeritus' nursing home, were sued by a resident who was
allegedly injured by Morris. Emeritus tendered the lawsuit under a CGL
policy issued by National Union Fire Insurance Company ("National
Union"). As an employee at the time of the accident, Morris qualified
for additional insurance coverage under the policy. Morris, however, was
apparently unaware that he qualified for coverage, did not request a de-
fense under the policy, and failed to file an answer in the lawsuit. Na-
tional Union provided a defense to Emeritus, but did not defend Morris
even though it was aware that he qualified for coverage and that he had
been served with the lawsuit. The claims against Morris were severed,
and a $1,000,000 default judgment was entered against Morris. The
claimant then sued National Union as a third-party beneficiary under the
policy in an effort to collect the judgment.10 1
National Union argued that the duty to defend was never trigged be-
cause Morris had not provided notice of the lawsuit nor requested a de-
fense under the policy. 102 Conversely, the claimant argued that because
National Union had actual notice of the lawsuit against Morris, it was not
prejudiced by Morris' failure to comply with the policy's notice provisions
and had a duty to notify Morris of his insured status. The district court
concluded that Texas law required National Union to show prejudice to
establish a notice-based policy defense and that National Union breached
the duty to defend by failing to notify Morris that a defense was available
under the policy.10 3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified the following
three questions to the Texas Supreme Court:
[(1)] Where an additional insured does not and cannot be presumed
to know of coverage under an insurer's liability policy, does an in-
surer that has knowledge that a suit implicating policy coverage has
been filed against its additional insured have a duty to inform the
additional insured of the available coverage?
10 4
[(2)] If the above question is answered in the affirmative, what is the
extent or proper measure of the insurer's duty to inform the addi-
tional insured, and what is the extent or measure of any duty on the
part of the additional insured to cooperate with the insurer up to the
point he is informed of the policy provisions?
10 5
[(3)] Does proof of an insurer's actual knowledge of service of pro-
cess in a suit against its additional insured, when such knowledge is
obtained in sufficient time to provide a defense for the insured, es-
tablish as a matter of law the absence of prejudice to the insurer
from the additional insured's failure to comply with the notice-of-suit
provisions of the policy? 106
101. Id. at 605.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 606.
105. Id. at 608.
106. Id. at 609.
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Because the supreme court answered the first question "no," it did not
answer the second question and answered the third question "no. ' 10 7
On the first question, the supreme court stated that "[p]ut simply, there
is no duty to provide a defense absent a request for coverage. ' 108 The
supreme court relied on its decision in Weaver v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co.,10 9 in which it held that "an insurer was not liable to an
additional insured's judgment creditor when the additional insured failed
to notify the insurer that he had been served with process, even though
the insurer knew about the suit, and the additional insured knew nothing
about the policy." 110 Based on Weaver, the supreme court held that
"[m]ere awareness of a claim or suit does not impose a duty on the in-
surer to defend under the policy; there is no unilateral duty to act unless
and until the additional insured first requests a defense-a threshold duty
that the insured fulfills under the policy by notifying the insurer that the
insured has been served with process and the insurer is expected to an-
swer on its behalf."1'' However, the supreme court did emphasize that
"[o]f course, an insurer that is aware an additional insured has been sued
may, and perhaps should, choose to inform the insured that a defense is
available .... ,112
As to the third question, the supreme court concluded that an insurer's
actual knowledge that an additional insured has been served does not
establish, as a matter of law, that the insurer was not prejudiced because
an insurer has no duty to either inform the additional insured of available
coverage or to voluntarily undertake a defense for the insured.113 Absent
a threshold duty to defend, the supreme court held that the insurer could
not have liability to Morris or to the claimant derivatively.' 4 In reaching
this holding, the supreme court distinguished the instant case from other
decisions addressing late notice by an insured, explaining that the addi-
tional insured's notice here "was not merely late; it was wholly
lacking."' 15
2. Whether There Is an Exception to the "Eight-Corners" Rule That
Permits Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence in Determining
the Duty to Defend
An ongoing issue of debate in Texas has been whether an exception to
the "eight-corners" rule exists to permit the consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence in determining an insurer's duty to defend. In 2006, the Texas Su-
preme Court provided some guidance on this issue in GuideOne Elite
107. Id. at 604, 608-09.
108. Id. at 607.
109. 570 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1978).
110. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d at 606.
111. Id. at 608 (emphasis in original).
112. Id.





Insurance Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, where it refused to adopt
any exception to the "eight-corners" rule for "liability only" or "overlap-
ping/mixed fact" scenarios.1 1 6 The supreme court, however, did not ex-
pressly rule out the use of extrinsic evidence that is relevant solely to a
discrete issue of coverage that does not overlap with the liability issues.
Accordingly, Texas courts have continued to grapple with whether, and
under what circumstances, extrinsic evidence can be admitted to deter-
mine the insurer's duty to defend.
The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Graham.117 There, an employee of the insured company was involved
in an accident while driving a company vehicle for personal use and was
sued as a result. The underlying pleading contained allegations indicating
that the employee had the insured company's permission to use the vehi-
cle for personal use. Accordingly, the employee sought coverage under
his employer's policy, arguing that he was a permissive user and that the
policy defined insured to include "[a]nyone else while using with your
permission a covered auto you own, hire or borrow .... -118 The insurer
argued that the underlying pleading did not allege permissive use of the
vehicle and that, even if it did, consideration of extrinsic evidence show-
ing that the employee was not a permissive user was appropriate because
the evidence related solely to a coverage determination.1 ' 9
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in
favor of the insurer, holding that the court's admission of extrinsic evi-
dence on the duty to defend was improper after GuideOne.a2° The court
explained that based on a liberal construction of the underlying plead-
ing's allegations, it was "reasonable to infer that the plaintiffs assert that
[the employee] was driving the vehicle with [the insured company's] per-
mission at the time of the accident. '121 While the court acknowledged
that there is the "limited exception to the eight corners rule applied by
some Texas appellate courts and approved in the GuideOne decision's
dicta," the court decided the exception was inapplicable for two rea-
sons. 122 First, the underlying pleading was specific enough to determine
coverage without resorting to extrinsic evidence.' 23 Second, the court
found that the coverage issue did not turn on the applicability of a spe-
cific-coverage exclusion, noting that the cases allowing extrinsic evidence
"are distinguishable because they involved explicit policy coverage exclu-
sion clauses, the applicability of which could not be established under the
allegations of the complaint but rather required reference to unrelated
but readily ascertainable facts."1 24 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit acknowl-
116. 197 S.W.3d 305, 310-11 (Tex. 2006).
117. 473 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 598.
119. Id. at 599.
120. Id. at 602.
121. Id.
122. Id.




edged the possibility of using "coverage only" extrinsic evidence, it con-
cluded that the exception to the "eight-corners" rule was inapplicable in
the case before it.125
In D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Markel International Insurance Co., the
Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District also refused to per-
mit the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the duty to defend in the
additional insured context. 126 The general contractor required all sub-
contractors to name it as an additional insured under their policies. The
general contractor was sued in a construction defect case and sought ad-
ditional insured coverage under the liability policies issued to its masonry
subcontractor. The masonry subcontractor's liability insurers denied cov-
erage for the general contractor because the underlying pleading did not
name any subcontractors or refer to the subcontractors. The general con-
tractor sued the insurers and sought to introduce extrinsic evidence that
the alleged damages were caused by the masonry subcontractor. While
recognizing that the general contractor had "produced a significant
amount of summary judgment evidence that ... links [the masonry sub-
contractor] to the injuries claimed," the court of appeals concluded that
the extrinsic evidence related to both coverage and liability and therefore
refused to permit the use of the extrinsic evidence. 127 The general con-
tractor has filed a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, ask-
ing the court to expressly adopt a "coverage only" exception to the "eight
corners" rule.
In Roberts, Taylor & Sensabaugh, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed the use
of extrinsic evidence that did not "engage the truth or falsity of any facts
alleged in the underlying case" or "affect the third party's right of recov-
ery."1 28 There, the general contractor hired a subcontractor for a con-
struction project and required the subcontractor to procure liability
insurance naming the general contractor as an additional insured for lia-
bility arising from the subcontractor's work on the project. 129 The sub-
contractor hired another contractor to perform part of the work, and an
employee of that sub-subcontractor was injured and sued the general
contractor. The subcontractor's insurer denied additional insured cover-
age for the general contractor because the pleading did not allege that the
injured employee was performing work for the subcontractor or that the
subcontractor was working for the general contractor. 130
The general contractor sued the insurer for a declaration that a duty to
defend existed and asked the court to consider extrinsic evidence of the
subcontracts between the various parties, arguing that this evidence was
125. Id. at 602-03.
126. No. 14-05-00486-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9346, at *16 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 2006, pet. filed).
127. Id.
128. No. H-06-2197, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75075, *20 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2007).
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *4.
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necessary to determine whether its liability in the underlying suit arose
from the subcontractor's work and to establish its status as an additional
insured. 31 The court decided that extrinsic evidence of the parties' con-
tracts was admissible because "[s]uch evidence shows the circumstances
under which [the employee] was working when the incident at issue oc-
curred, not whether, how, or why any injury occurred or who may be
responsible," and evidence of the contracts would not engage the truth or
falsity of the employee's allegations. 132
D. NOTICE PROVISIONS
1. Late Notice Will Not Defeat Advertising Injury Coverage Under a
CGL Policy if the Insurer Was Not Prejudiced by the Delay
In PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court held
that an insured's failure to timely notify its insurer of a claim or suit will
not defeat advertising injury coverage under a CGL policy if the insurer
was not prejudiced by delay. 133 The policy required the insured to notify
the insurer of suits "as soon as practicable. ' 134 The insured was sued for
copyright infringement but failed to provide notice of the lawsuit for four
to six months. After the insurer's denial of coverage, the insured sought a
judicial declaration that the insurer was contractually obligated to pro-
vide a defense and indemnification. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, stipulating that the notice was not "as soon as practi-
cable" and that the insurer was not prejudiced by the late notice.1 35 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that
the insurer was not required to demonstrate prejudice to avoid coverage
under the policy, which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
1 36
At the Texas Supreme Court, the insurer argued that the policy's
prompt notice requirement was a condition precedent to coverage, "the
failure of which defeats coverage under the policy irrespective of
prejudice to the insurer. ' 137 Conversely, the insured argued that the no-
tice provision "creates a covenant, the breach of which excuses perform-
ance only if the breach is 'material,"' and that even if the provision was a
condition precedent, Texas law required the insurer to prove that it was
prejudiced by the untimely notice. 138
Accepting the insured's position, the supreme court held that only a
material breach of the timely notice provision would excuse the insurer's
131. Id. at *4-5.
132. Id. at *20; see also Boss Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., No. H-06-2397,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69666, *38 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2007) (allowed use of extrinsic evi-
dence to determine earliest date after which damage occurred).
133. 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008).
134. Id. at 631.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 631-32.




performance.1 39 In reaching this holding, the supreme court relied on its
prior decision in Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds,140 where the supreme
court had applied "fundamental principle[s] of contract law" and, without
distinguishing between covenants and conditions, concluded that the in-
sured's breach of a settlement-without-consent provision was immaterial
and did not relieve the insurer from liability. 141 The supreme court found
that the policy language at issue in Hernandez was indistinguishable from
the policy language presently before it.142
The supreme court further reasoned that the timely notice provision
was not an essential part of the bargained-for exchange under this occur-
rence-based policy. 14 3 Noting prior Fifth Circuit decisions "aptly
describ[ing] the critical distinction between 'occurrence' policies and
'claims-made' policies," the supreme court explained that "[i]n the case of
an 'occurrence' policy, any notice requirement is subsidiary to the event
that triggers coverage. Courts have not permitted insurance companies
to deny coverage on the basis of untimely notice under an 'occurrence'
policy unless the company shows actual prejudice from the delay.1 44 Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court held that "only a material breach of the
timely notice provision will excuse [the insurer's] performance under the
policy," and that in the absence of prejudice here, the late notice did not
preclude coverage. 145
2. Whether the Notice-Prejudice Rule Applies to Claims-Made Policies
On the same day as its PAJ, Inc. decision, the Texas Supreme Court
granted the petition for review in Prodigy Communications, Inc. v. Agri-
cultural Excess & Surplus Insurance, Co.,' 46 and accepted a certified
question from the Fifth Circuit in XL Specialty Insurance Co. v. Financial
Industries Corp..147 Both of these cases address the application of the
notice-prejudice rule in the context of claims-made policies, as opposed
to occurrence policies.
, In Prodigy Communications, Inc., the insured was served with a lawsuit
alleging violations of federal securities laws on June 20, 2002, but "did not
give written notice of the lawsuit" under its directors and officers liability
policy "until June 6, 2003, nearly one year later.' 48 The insurer denied
the claim based on the policy's notice requirement, which required that
the insureds,
139. Id. at 636.
140. 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994).
141. PAJ, Inc., 243 S.W.3d at 633.
142. Id. at 635.
143. Id. at 636.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 636-37.
146. 195 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. granted).
147. 259 F. App'x 675, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).
148. Prodigy Commc'ns, 195 S.W.3d at 766.
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as a condition precedent to their rights under this Policy, give the
Insurer notice, in writing, as soon as practicable of any Claim first
made against the Directors and Officers during the Policy Period, or
Discovery Period . . ., but in no event later than ninety (90) days
after the expiration of the Policy Period or Discovery Period, and
shall give the Insurer such information and cooperation as it may
reasonably require. 149
The insured argued that it gave timely notice because the phrase "but in
no event later than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Policy
Period or Discovery Period" modified the phrase "as soon as practica-
ble," thereby creating a safe harbor by allowing notice of a claim at any
time before the end of the ninety-day period, regardless of when the
claim was made or when the insured received notice of the claim.150 The
insurer countered that the policy required written notice to be given "as
soon as practicable," and that "notice more than eleven months after ser-
vice of the lawsuit was not 'as soon as practicable' as a matter of law.'
151
The Dallas Court of Appeals determined that the insured's interpretation
was contrary to the plain meaning of the words used in the policy and that
the insurer was not required to prove it was prejudiced as a result of the
untimely notice.1 52 The supreme court heard oral argument in this case
on April 1, 2008.
In XL Specialty Insurance Co., the claims-made management liability
policy required that notice of any claim be given to the insurer "as soon
as practicable after it is first made" as a condition precedent to payment
under the policy.1 53 The insured provided notice of a lawsuit seven
months after the suit was filed but within the policy's coverage period.
The insurer denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that the
policy did not provide coverage based on the insured's late notice. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, conclud-
ing that "an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice from late notice to
avoid coverage on a claims-made policy."'
154
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Texas Supreme Court, in the
context of a settlement without consent policy provision, had reasoned
that "'[i]nsurance policies are contracts, and as such are subject to rules
applicable to contracts generally.' Those rules direct that a breach must
be material-i.e., must cause prejudice-to excuse performance by the
non-breaching party," and that the supreme court's "reasoning is argua-
bly broad enough to encompass other clauses as well.' 55 However, the
Fifth Circuit also noted that the "Texas Courts of Appeals currently ap-
pear to take different positions on the prejudice requirement" and that
149. Id.
150. Id. at 766-67.
151. Id. at 767.
152. Id.
153. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Fin. Indus. Corp., 259 F. App'x 675, 676 (5th Cir. 2007).
154. Id.




four cases involving the notice-prejudice rule were pending before the
Texas Supreme Court.156 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit declined to follow
its earlier decisions holding that "prejudice is required in all occurrence
policies, but that insurers need not provide prejudice in claims-made poli-
cies," and instead certified the following question to the Texas Supreme
Court: "Must an insurer show prejudice to deny payment on a claims-
made policy, when the denial is based upon the insured's breach of the
policy's prompt-notice provision, but the notice is nevertheless given
within the policy's coverage period?" 157 The Texas Supreme Court heard
oral argument in XL Specialty Insurance Co. on April 1, 2008.
E. THE MADE WHOLE DOCTRINE DOES NOT LIMIT A
CONTRACTUAL SUBROGATION RIGHT
In Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether the equitable "made whole" doctrine trumps an insurer's con-
tract-based subrogation rights.158 There, the medical insurer intervened
in the insured's personal injury suit and asserted a subrogation claim to
recover the amount of the medical benefits it had paid to the insured out
of the insured's settlement with the tortfeasors. "A divided court of ap-
peals upheld a trial court finding that because [the insured's] medical ex-
penses exceeded the settlement amount plus the benefits [the insurer]
had paid," the equitable made whole doctrine barred the insurer's subro-
gation claim.159
The supreme court first recognized the made whole doctrine in Ortiz v.
Great Southern Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., holding that "[a]n insurer
is not entitled to subrogation if the insured's loss is in excess of the
amounts recovered from the insurer and the third party causing the
loss. '' 160 The supreme court explained that Ortiz would govern if the in-
surer had asserted only a claim for equitable subrogation; the insurer
here, however, was relying on contractual rights of recovery specifically
stated in the policy. 161 The supreme court reasoned that contractual sub-
rogation clauses express the parties' intent that reimbursement should be
controlled by agreed contract terms rather than external rules imposed by
the courts. The supreme court emphasized that given this policy's plain
language, it was "loathe to judicially rewrite the parties' contract by en-
grafting extra-contractual standards that neither the Legislature nor the
Texas Department of Insurance has thus far decided to promulgate.'
' 62
The supreme court therefore concluded that contractual subrogation
rights "should be governed by the parties' express agreement and not
156. Id. at 677.
157. Id. at 677-78.
158. 234 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tex. 2007).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 644-45 (quoting Ortiz v. Great S. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 342, 343
(Tex. 1980)).
161. Id. at 645.
162. Id. at 647-49.
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invalidated by equitable considerations that might control by default in
the absence of an agreement."'1 63
The specific policy language at issue stated that the insurer would be
subrogated to "all rights" of recovery that the insured may have against
"any person or organization," and that such right would extend to the
proceeds of "any settlement or judgment.' 64 The supreme court inter-
preted this language as giving the insurer an "unfettered right" of recov-
ery and not suggesting that the insured must first be made whole before
the insurer could recover.165 The supreme court, therefore, concluded
that the policy language controlled the insurer's right to subrogation, that
the equitable defense of the made whole doctrine "must give way," and
that the insurer was contractually entitled to recover out of the insured's
settlement the full amount of the benefits it had paid. 166
F. THE FORTUITY DOCTRINE APPLIES TO CLAIMS-MADE POLICIES
In Warrantech Corp. v. Steadfast Insurance Co., the Forth Worth Court
of Appeals decided that the fortuity doctrine could be applied to a
claims-made liability policy to bar coverage for an underlying suit against
the insured. 167 This doctrine provides:
Insurance is designed to protect against unknown, fortuitous risks,
and fortuity is a requirement of all policies of insurance. An insured
cannot insure against something that has already begun and which is
known to have begun. The fortuity doctrine precludes coverage for
two categories of losses: known losses and losses in progress. A
"known loss" is one that the insured knew had occurred before the
insured entered into the contract for insurance. A "loss in progress"
involves those situations in which the insured knows, or should
know, of a loss that is ongoing at the time the policy is issued. 168
Attempting to defeat application of this doctrine, the insured argued
that until rendition of judgment on the underlying claim, the loss is uncer-
tain and cannot be "known." The court rejected this argument, finding
that it was "fatally undermined" by the many Texas cases applying the
fortuity doctrine "where the insured's liability was not yet fixed by judg-
ment. '169 The insured next argued that the nature of a claims-made pol-
icy anticipates the possibility of losses occurring before the policy's
inception and that applying the fortuity doctrine to this type of policy
would render the contract of insurance illusory because there would
never be coverage for losses occurring before the inception date. 170
Again rejecting the insured's position, the court explained that "fortuity
163. Id. at 650.
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 650-51.
166. Id. at 651.
167. 210 S.W.3d 760, 766-68 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
168. Id. at 766 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 766-67.
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is a requirement of all insurance policies" and that "it is not the existence
of a loss but [rather] the insured's knowledge of the loss that triggers the
fortuity doctrine. 1 71 As such, application of the doctrine to a claims-
made policy precludes coverage for only those losses of which the insured
knows, not "losses of which the insured is ignorant at the policy's incep-
tion."172 The court therefore concluded that the "doctrine does not
render claims-made insurance illusory but merely restricts coverage to
unknown losses."'1 73
In determining whether the doctrine applied in the instant case, the
court emphasized that "application of the fortuity doctrine does not hinge
on whether the insured knew a particular act was wrongful" but instead
"on whether the insured knew before the inception of coverage that an
act-knowingly wrongful or otherwise-resulted in a loss."' 174 Viewed in
this light, the facts showed that regardless of whether the insured had
acted intentionally or merely negligently, it knew of the loss caused by its
conduct long before the inception of the policy.1 75 Accordingly, the court
applied the fortuity doctrine and held that the insurer had no duty to
defend. 176
G. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY ("CGL") POLICIES
1. The Texas Supreme Court Ruled That Construction Defect Claims
May Allege an "Occurrence" and "Property Damage"
Triggering Coverage under CGL Policies
Answering certified questions from the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Su-
preme Court in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., re-
solved the split among Texas state and federal courts as to whether a
claim for defective construction or faulty workmanship that injures only
the insured's own work alleges an "occurrence" and "property damage"
sufficient to trigger coverage under a CGL policy.177 First addressing the
requirement of an "occurrence," which the policy defined as an "acci-
dent," the supreme court explained that an "accident is generally under-
stood to be a fortuitous, unexpected, and unintended event."'1 78 An
"intentional tort is not an accident and thus not an occurrence regardless
of whether the effect was unintended or unexpected," but a "deliberate
act, performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended
or expected result. ' 179
Thus, a claim does not involve an accident or occurrence when either
direct allegations purport that the insured intended the injury (which
171. Id. at 767.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 768.
175. Id. at 767-68.
176. Id. at 768.
177. 242 S.W.3d 1, 4-7 (Tex. 2007).




is presumed in cases of intentional tort) or circumstances confirm
that the resulting damage was the natural and expected result of the
insured's actions, that is, was highly probable whether the insured
was negligent or not.180
The supreme court emphasized that when applying these principles in
the context of construction defect claims, the "determination of whether
an insured's faulty workmanship was intended or accidental is dependent
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case," which, with respect
to the duty to defend governed by the eight-corners rule, "must generally
be gleaned" from the claimant's pleading. 18 Because the pleading at is-
sue asserted that the insured's defective construction was a product of its
negligence and there was no allegation that the insured intended or ex-
pected its work or its subcontractors' work to damage the house, the
court concluded that the pleading alleged an "occurrence.' 8 2
The supreme court next addressed the requirement of "property dam-
age," which the policy defined as "[p]hysical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that property. ' 18 3 The supreme court
found that this definition did not, on its face, eliminate the insured's work
because the home and its component parts were "tangible property," and
the underlying allegations of cracking sheetrock and stone veneer were
allegations of "physical injury" to "tangible property."'1 84 The federal dis-
trict court had reasoned that "damage to the [insured] homebuilder's own
work, the home, cannot be 'property damage' because CGL insurance
exists not to repair or replace the insured's defective work" and that find-
ing coverage for such damage would transform "CGL insurance into a
performance bond."'185 The supreme court, however, rejected this rea-
soning as "irrelevant," stating, "[t]he CGL policy covers what it covers.
No rule of construction operates to eliminate coverage simply because
similar protection may be available through another insurance prod-
uct."'1 86 The supreme court also rejected the insurer's reliance on the ec-
onomic-loss rule, reasoning that the CGL policy makes no distinction
between tort and contract damages and that "any preconceived notion
that a CGL policy is only for tort liability must yield to the policy's actual
language. '187
The supreme court ultimately concluded that construction defect alle-
gations may allege an "occurrence" and "property damage" sufficient to
trigger the duty to defend under a CGL policy, summarizing its analysis
as follows:
180. Id. at 9.
181. Id.
182. Id.




187. Id. at 12-13.
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The proper inquiry is whether an "occurrence" has caused "property
damage," not whether the ultimate remedy for that claim lies in con-
tract or in tort. An "occurrence" depends on the fortuitous nature of
the event, that is, whether the damage was expected or intended
from the standpoint of the insured . . . . "Property damage" consists
of physical injury to tangible property and includes the loss of use of
tangible property. Thus, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that "claims
for damage caused by an insured's defective performance or faulty
workmanship" may constitute an "occurrence" when "property dam-
age" results from the "unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned hap-
pening or consequence" of the insured's negligent behavior.188
2. The Fifth Circuit Certified the Issue of When Property Damage
"Occurs"
In OneBeacon Insurance Co. v. Don's Building Supply, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit asked the Texas Supreme Court to resolve the split among Texas
courts concerning the proper rule to determine when property damage
"occurs" under a CGL policy. 18 9 The insured sought coverage for
twenty-two lawsuits filed against it by homeowners claiming damage to
their homes due to defective Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems
("EIFS") sold by the insured. Each of the underlying petitions pleaded
the discovery rule to avoid the application of the statute of limitations
and alleged that although the damage remained undiscoverable until
some point within two years of the filing of the suit, the damage actually
began to occur at the time of the first moisture penetration, which was six
months to one year after the application of the EIFS, and was continuous
thereafter.1 90 The district court reasoned that because the first suit was
filed on August 13, 2003, "none of the petitions allege[d] damage that
could have been discovered before August 13, 2001," which was after the
expiration of the policy period in 1996, and therefore none of the suits
alleged property damage that manifested during the policy period.19 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Texas Supreme Court
"has not yet adopted a particular rule for determining when property
damage occurs and that the Texas courts of appeals "are split on the ap-
propriate rule."1 92 The Dallas, San Antonio, and Austin courts of appeals
have adopted the "manifestation rule," holding "that property damage
occurs at the time that the damage manifests, which ... [is] defined as the
time when the damage becomes apparent or identifiable. 1 193 Conversely,
the Houston courts of appeals have "rejected this 'manifestation rule' and
instead applied the 'exposure rule' to harms caused by continuous or re-
188. Id. at 16 (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grapevine Excavation, Inc., 197 F.3d
720, 725 (5th Cir. 1999)).
189. 496 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2007).
190. Id. at 363.
191. Id. at 363-64.




peated exposure to conditions during a policy period.' 94 Although the
Fifth Circuit had previously made an "Erie guess" and applied the mani-
festation rule, this ruling was based on the Dallas Court of Appeals' opin-
ions and was made prior to the Houston Court of Appeals' adoption of
the exposure rule.' 95
Given this split in authority among the Texas courts of appeals, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the appropriate rule would be better deter-
mined by the Texas Supreme Court.' 96 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit cer-
tified the following questions:
1. When not specified by the relevant policy, what is the proper
rule under Texas law for determining the time at which property
damage occurs for purposes of an occurrence-based commercial gen-
eral liability insurance policy?
2. Under the rule identified in the answer to the first question, have
the pleadings in lawsuits against an insured alleged that property
damage occurred within the policy period of an occurrence-based
commercial general liability insurance policy, such that the insurer's
duty to defend and indemnify the insured is triggered, when the
pleadings allege that actual damage was continuing and progressing
during the policy period, but remained undiscoverable and not read-
ily apparent for purposes of the discovery rule until after the policy
period ended because the internal damage was hidden from view by
an undamaged exterior surface?1 97
3. Policy Language Affording Additional Insured Coverage with
Respect to the Named Insured's Operations Requires Only a
Causal Connection or Relation Between the Event and
the Operations, Not Proximate or Legal Causation
In addition to the issues discussed earlier in this article, the Texas Su-
preme Court's opinion in Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA Petro-
chemicals, Inc., also addressed "the interplay between a contractual
indemnity provision and a service contract's requirement to name an ad-
ditional insured." Specifically the case assessed whether a liability policy
"purchased to secure the insured's indemnity obligation in a service con-
tract with a third party also provide[d] direct liability coverage for the
third party.' 98 ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc. ("ATOFINA") con-
tracted with Triple S Industrial Corporation ("Triple S") to perform
maintenance and construction work at its refinery. Pursuant to the ser-
vice contract, Triple S agreed to indemnify ATOFINA from all personal
injuries and property losses sustained during the performance of the con-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 364-65.
196. Id. at 365 (presenting the additional unresolved issue of "whether property dam-
age can be deemed to have occurred under the governing rule during a time in which the
pleadings state that the damage was undiscoverable for purposes of the discovery rule").
197. Id. at 366.
198. 256 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. 2008).
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tract, except to the extent that the loss was attributable to ATOFINA.
Triple S was also required to procure a CGL policy and a following-form
excess or umbrella policy indicating ATOFINA as an additional in-
sured.1 99 A Triple S employee who was working at the ATOFINA facility
under the service contract drowned after he fell through the roof of a
storage tank. The employee's survivors sued Triple S and ATOFINA for
wrongful death. After the primary insurer tendered its policy limits,
ATOFINA sought coverage as an additional insured under the Evanston
Insurance Company's ("Evanston") umbrella policy. Evanston denied
coverage on the ground that the loss was caused by ATOFINA's
negligence. 200
The supreme court explained that although the service contract pre-
cluded ATOFINA's indemnification by Triple S, if the loss was occa-
sioned in any way by ATOFINA's negligence, ATOFINA was not
seeking indemnity from Triple S; instead, ATOFINA's position was that it
was entitled to indemnification from Evanston based on its status as an
additional insured on the umbrella policy issued to Triple S. 20 1 Thus, con-
trary to the court of appeals' focus on the service contract's indemnity
agreement, the supreme court focused on the terms of the umbrella pol-
icy itself, which included as an additional insured "[a] person or organiza-
tion for whom you have agreed to provide insurance as is afforded by this
policy; but that person or organization is an insured only with respect to
operations performed by you or on your behalf, or facilities owned or
used by you."'20 2 Evanston argued that this language did not cover an
additional insured for its own negligence, that because the employee's
death "was caused solely by ATOFINA's negligence, the death did not
'respect' . . . operations performed by [Triple S]," and that ATOFINA
therefore did not qualify as an additional insured.203
The supreme court noted that the courts of appeals had reached diver-
gent results in addressing such additional insured provisions. Some
courts adopted a fault-based interpretation of "arising out of operations,"
finding coverage only if the insured's wrongful act during the operation
caused the injury.204 Conversely, other courts have used "a more liberal
causation theory," finding that the loss could be "with respect to liability
arising out of" the named insured's operations, and thus covered even
though the claimants alleged that the additional insured acted negli-
199. Id. at 662-63.
200. Id. at 663.
201. Id. at 664.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Granite Constr. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Cos., 832 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) ("[Tihe claim did not 'aris[e] out of operations performed




gently.205 The supreme court adopted the second approach stated in Ad-
miral and McCarthy:
[R]egardless of the underlying service agreement's terms, we do not
follow Granite because the fault-based interpretation of this kind of
additional insured endorsement no longer prevails. Instead, we in-
terpret "with respect to operations" under a broader theory of causa-
tion. Generally, an event "respects" operations if there exists "a
causal connection or relation" between the event and the operations;
we do not require proximate cause or legal causation. In cases in
which the premises condition caused a personal injury, the injury re-
spects an operation if the operation brings the person to the premises
for purposes of that operation. The particular attribution of fault
between insured and additional insured does not change the
outcome.20
6
Appling these principles, the supreme court found that the injury
respected operations performed by Triple S because the injured employee
was employed by Triple S and was present at ATOFINA's facility for
purposes of Triple S's operations when the accident occurred. 207 Accord-
ingly, the supreme court concluded that even if ATOFINA's negligence
alone caused the injury, the umbrella policy's additional insured provision
afforded direct insurance coverage to ATOFINA.208
H. AUTO POLICIES
In Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme
Court resolved several issues regarding uninsured/underinsured motorist
("UIM") coverage. 20 9 First, the supreme court addressed whether UIM
insurance covers prejudgment interest that the underinsured motorist
would owe the insured in tort liability.210 The UIM policy obligated the
insurer to pay "damages" that the insured was legally entitled to recover
from the underinsured motorist.211 The supreme court explained that the
purpose of prejudgment interest is to "fully compensate the injured party,
not to punish the defendant," and that it has "consistently viewed pre-
judgment interest as falling within the common law meaning of
damages. '212
The insurer argued that the policy's requirement that the damages must
be "'because of bodily injury or property damage"' negated coverage
"for prejudgment interest because the essence of prejudgment interest is
205. Id. at 665 (citing McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Cont'l Lloyds Ins. Co., 7 S.W.3d 725, 727,
730-31 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.); Admiral Ins. Co. v. Trident NGL, Inc., 988
S.W.2d 451, 453-55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)).
206. Id. at 666.
207. Id. at 667
208. Id.
209. 216 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex. 2006).
210. Id. at 812-15.
211. id. at 812.
212. Id. at 812-13.
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compensation for lost use of money, not damages from bodily injury. 213
The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning:
[The UIM statute's] compensatory purpose is well served when the
insured obtains, in addition to actual damages, any prejudgment in-
terest that the underinsured motorist would owe the insured. [The
insurer's] attempt to give the phrase "because of bodily injury" an
artificially literal meaning-so as to establish a nexus requirement
that eliminates coverage for prejudgment interest-has no basis in
the statute's history or our precedent, under which [the statute] is
liberally construed to protect persons who are legally entitled to re-
cover damages from underinsured motorists.
214
The supreme court ultimately held that "UIM insurance covers pre-
judgment interest that the underinsured motorist would owe the in-
sured. '215 Additionally, the court also held that: (1) any credits for
settlements and personal injury protection should be applied in the pre-
judgment interest calculation using the "declining principal" formula,
under which each credit is applied according to the date on which it was
received; and (2) the insured may recover attorney's fees from the UIM
insurer under chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
only if the insurer does not tender UIM benefits within thirty days after
the trial court signs a judgment establishing the liability and underinsured
status of the other motorist.2
16
213. Id. at 813.
214. Id. at 814 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(5) (Vernon 1981)).
215. Id. at 815.
216. Id. at 811, 815-19. See also Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 223 S.W.3d 586, 589
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. denied) (determining, based on Brainard, that the UIM
insurer's payment within two days of the judgment against the motorist precluded an
award of attorney's fees to the insured).
2008]
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